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ABSTRACT
We study carding shops that sell stolen credit and debit card in-
formation online. By bypassing the anti-scrapping mechanisms
they use, we find that the prices of cards depend heavily on fac-
tors such as the issuing bank, country of origin, and whether the
card can be used in brick-and-mortar stores or not. Almost 70%
of cards sold by these outfits are priced at or below the cost banks
incur in re-issuing them. Ironically, this makes buying their own
cards more economical for the banks than re-issuing. We also find
that the monthly revenues for the carding shops we study are high
enough to justify the risk fraudsters take. Further, inventory at card-
ing outfits seems to follow data breaches and the impact of delayed
deployment of the smart chip technology is evident in the dispro-
portionate share the U.S. commands in the underground card fraud
economy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.3.5 [Online Information
Services]: Web-based services; J.4 [Computer Applications]: So-
cial and behavioral sciences
General Terms: Credit card fraud; data breach; black markets;
underground economy; online fraud
Keywords: Stolen credit cards; dump; CVV; smart chip; EMV
1 INTRODUCTION
A large number of data breaches, including, Anthem [1], Tar-
get [2], Sony [3], Home Depot [3], Staples [3], Kmart [3], and
Michaels Stores [3] have occurred in the past year. As a result,
millions of consumers’ financial and medical information has been
exposed to cyber criminals, who can use the information for finan-
cial, political, and other types of gains. The most common impact
of these breaches is the theft of credit card information, which can
then be traded in underground black markets on the Web [4, 5].
Underground black markets are efficient. The first batches of
stolen credit card information from the Target and Home De-
pot breaches became available for sale almost immediately after
the breach was first reported. The illegal markets are also nim-
ble. As law enforcement shuts down the servers hosting online
marketplaces and arrest the criminals responsible for the security
breaches, thieves find new ways to thrive, often by switching host-
ing providers in the blink of an eye. During our study, an online
marketplace, rescator.so, changed domain names twice: it
shifted from rescator.so to rescator.cc sometime around
July-September 2014, and it later changed to rescator.cm at
the end of November 2014.
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There already have been a few studies related to the credit card
fraud economy. Previous research [6, 7] studied underground mar-
ketplaces for credit card fraud, identity theft, spamming, phishing,
online credential theft, and the sale of compromised hosts. Much
has changed since these studies, including the usage of IRC (Inter-
net Relay Chat), which significantly declined over the past decade.
Since these studies were broader in scope, they did not focus on
credit cards in particular. More recent work [8] has focused on on-
line credit card black markets. We complement their preliminary
work by studying debit cards in addition to credit cards, and also
by dissecting the evolution of these marketplaces and the evasion
tactics they employ longitudinally.
In this paper, we undertake a measurement study of three online
carding shops – rescator.cm, dumps.pw, and 2pac.cc –
that sell stolen credit and debit cards. Our approach was to register
at these marketplaces and collect publicly available information to
understand their inventory and revenue, among other things. This
gave us many insights into the operations of a typical Web-based
carding shop. Note that we chose not to purchase any of the credit
cards offered for sale due to legal reasons [9, 10], even though it
would have been interesting to understand the credit card fraud
economy end to end. Our work can not only guide defense strate-
gies for issuing banks and merchants but also serve as a benchmark
for the effectiveness of smart chip technology (often referred to as
EMV) [11], which makes it practically impossible to clone stolen
credit cards as the deadline for its adoption approaches. The key
findings from our work are the following:
• Factors impacting prices: We discuss the impact of the issuing
bank, the card type, the country of origin, and other factors on
the prices of credit and debit cards sold on the black market. For
example, we find that credit cards are not only more popular than
debit cards in online carding shops, but they also cost 22% more.
• It is cheaper for banks to buy: Issuing new cards following a
breach costs money and creates an inconvenience for the con-
sumer. Somewhat surprisingly, we observe that almost 70% cards
sold are priced at or below $10.00, which is the cost issuing
banks incur. Though not recommended, ironically, this makes
buying their own cards more economical than re-issuing.
• Online carding shops are thriving: The monthly revenues for
carding shops we studied ranged from $181K-277K per month,
suggesting that criminals find the pursuit lucrative enough to jus-
tify the risk.
• Smart chip helps: Cards issued in the U.S. command a dispropor-
tionately higher share at all carding shops, implying that coun-
tries where smart chip technology has been deployed are reaping
the anti-cloning benefits offered by the technology.
• Anti-scrapping mechanisms are heavily used: One of the card-
ing shops we study requires one to solve a CAPTCHA approx-
imately every 100 minutes of continuous browsing. Two more
shops monitor if requests are originating from a browser. These
impediments posed numerous technical difficulties in data col-
lection, and we had to constantly adapt the scraper to keep up.
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• Inventory follows breaches: We find evidence that the inventory
of stolen cards at the carding shops increases immediately fol-
lowing breaches, pointing to the efficiency of such outfits.
2 BACKGROUND
We will use the generic term “card” to refer to both credit and
debit cards throughout this paper. Here, we provide an overview of
the fraud pipeline and position the scope of our study.
2.1 Fraud pipeline
The fraud economy surrounding credit and debit cards can be
thought of as a four-step pipeline. The first step in this pipeline
is the theft of either card information or the physical card. The
latter is less common. Cyber criminals achieve the former in var-
ious ways. The common techniques used in the security breaches
of the last year included placing malware at the point-of-sale (POS)
system used to swipe cards at brick-and-mortar stores, and infiltrat-
ing servers storing customer information. Card skimmers – devices
used to steal card information during physical transactions at gas
pumps, automatic teller machines, etc. – are also common.
Carding shops then acquire the stolen cards or information and
offer them for sale [4]. The acquisition of the stolen data is the
second step of the pipeline. The focus of this paper is the third step
of the pipeline, where carding shops place stolen card information
up for sale. Carding shops offer two types of debit and credit cards.
First, a dump, is card information stolen from physical locations,
such as POS devices. Their output contains enough information
to clone a card’s magnetic track, writers for which can be pur-
chased easily for under $400 (for example, Unitech MSR206 [12]).
Dumps can only be used to produce physical cards that must be
used at brick-and-mortar stores [13, 14] because they lack informa-
tion generally known only to the cardholder (e.g. billing address).
The second type of cards sold at carding shops are referred to as the
CVV. Such cards contain credit/debit card information stolen from
an online merchant. CVVs can only be used for online transactions
since they lack magnetic track information needed for producing
physical cards [14].
In the final step, people who purchase a credit or debit card from
a carding shop try to monetize it by making unauthorized purchases.
2.2 Carding shops
At first glance, a carding marketplace resembles a legitimate
shopping website. There is a main page showing the latest card
availability, price drops, and website news. There is also an ac-
count page where the user can change their username/password
combination and view past purchases. Search engine integration
on product pages allows visitors to find what they are interested
in. The only difference from a typical legitimate online shopping
website is that the products offered for sale by these shops are not
legitimate. Perhaps as a consequence, most carding shops only ac-
cept payments via virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin and Litecoin,
which allow for secure transactions that are not only impossible to
reverse, but also do not contain any personal information. Although
some carding shops accept alternative forms of payment from out-
lets such as Western Union, they usually require a large minimum
deposit ($400 or more) and accept cash only. Furthermore, as an
added security measure, most currency transfers that are not done
via virtual currencies are required to be sent to a third party, a drop-
per, who then delivers the money to the merchant, which makes it
more difficult for the authorities to trace the money and incriminate
fraudsters. The involvement of a third party is the most likely rea-
son behind the large minimum deposit requirement since it would
make little sense for the dropper to pick up small bills.
Carding shops do differ from legitimate websites in other ways.
First, they all seem to feature mandatory account registration. Most
even require visitors to solve a CAPTCHA before allowing them
to view cards for sale. Furthermore, many outfits have begun us-
ing CloudFlare’s content delivery network and DDoS protection
services [15], which makes their websites more difficult to scrape
since all HTTP GET requests that are not being issued from a
browser are blocked by CloudFlare.
Finally, many carding shops do not allow their visitors to view
any product pages without a minimum deposit. The deposit re-
quirement limited our options for scraping significantly. Still, we
found three popular carding shops that did not require a deposit for
this study and collected a respectable amount of data.
2.3 Smart chip
A sea technical change in the credit card industry is in the works
in the U.S. Smart chip-enabled cards feature embedded electronic
chips that uniquely encode each transaction, making it more diffi-
cult for miscreants to counterfeit or copy such cards. According to
a number of reports, countries that adopted smart chip technology
saw a significant decline in credit card fraud [16, 17]. Still, as some
studies point out [18, 19], smart chip technology is far from being
flawless, and miscreants can exploit its weaknesses. It is expected
that as many as 70% of credit and 41% of debit cards in the U.S.
will have smart chips embedded in them by the end of 2015 [20].
Security researchers and practitioners would surely be interested in
seeing the fraud situation evolve post smart chip card deployment
in the U.S., for which our paper can serve as a benchmark.
3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data collection and challenges
Although there are a number of differences across various on-
line carding shops, they all feature the same basic structure – a
news page describing data availability from the latest breaches and
other website news, an account page where a person can see past
purchases and deposit money to their account, card dump pages
that list all credit and debit card dumps that are available for sale,
CVV pages which lists all online-only cards that are available for
sale, and a card check page which allows the customer to test the
validity of the purchased credit and debit cards. We limited our
data collection efforts to three types of pages – the news page, card
dump pages, and CVV pages – since this is the minimum set that
provides useful insights without treading into illegal territory.
Our initial data collection effort dates back to July 30, 2014,
when we began scraping two carding shops: 2pac.cc and
rescator.cm. Those two websites were chosen primarily due to
their relatively high Alexa rankings and similar web page structure.
We wrote a scraper in Python that would scrape those websites 24/7
by issuing HTTP GET requests for each page containing the data.
Since both carding shops required the solution to a CAPTCHA be-
fore entering the websites, we had to manually solve a CAPTCHA
at the beginning of each scrapping session, after which the scraper
would take over and authenticate with our username and password,
and then use the same browsing session to access the data.
To our surprise, both websites regularly went offline during that
time period for unexplained reasons. Still, everything went rela-
tively well until both shops started using CloudFlare as their con-
tent delivery network at approximately the same time. CloudFlare
detected our scraper and would not let us collect any data. We
changed the user agent used by the scraper, tried to send all HTTP
GET requests via Python’s urllib instead of the Requests library
in case there was a bug in the latter, and even tried converting the
scraper to Java to see if it would make a difference, but to no avail.
Since both carding shops were still working from a web browser,
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we decided to change our strategy and use the Selenium library
which allows one to automate web browsing and scraping.
The new strategy worked – CloudFlare was unable to detect our
scraper when it ran a Firefox browser in the background and col-
lected all information from there. Unfortunately, shortly thereafter
2pac.cc went offline due to the arrest of its owner [21, 22]. It
was still offline at the time of this writing.
After waiting for 2pac.cc to come online for some time, we
started to look for replacements. Unfortunately, most of the card-
ing shops were either abandoned, were offline, or required an ini-
tial deposit in order to view the contents. We eventually chose
dumps.pw as it seemed to be the best of the options. Similar
to 2pac.cc and rescator.cm, dumps.pw requires visitors to
solve a CAPTCHA before allowing them to access the website. In
what seems to be an effort to prevent people from scraping their
website, dumps.pw also requires the users to solve a CAPTCHA
and re-enter their credentials approximately every 100 minutes
of continuous browsing, which significantly complicated scraping
since someone had to be constantly solving the CAPTCHAs every
100 minutes (we could have collected the data for just under 100
minutes at a time, took a break, and then resumed, but that would
have resulted in the scraper missing the cards that would have been
added and sold during the break). We still managed to collect data
from dumps.pw, albeit not as much as from rescator.cm.
In the end, we collected data for two time periods: 07.30.2014-
08.27.2014 for rescator.cm and 2pac.cc and 10.28.2014-
present for rescator.cm and dumps.pw. Due to a hard disk
failure, we lost some of the data collected from 2pac.cc. Also,
the dumps.pw data collection began on 11.19.2014. Table 1 sum-
marizes the data we collected.
Carding shop Days Unique cards Average price Daily revenue
rescator.cm
(time period 1)
29 19,844 $8.78 –
2pac.cc 1 1,525 $20.64 –
rescator.cm
(time period 2)
96 58,684 $9.73 $6,034.90
dumps.pw 79 73,383 $11.66 $9,226.10
Table 1: Summary of data collection
3.2 Data description
All carding websites we crawled allow visitors to see limited
amount of information about the credit and debit cards in their
databases before making a purchase. The quality and quantity of
displayed information varied significantly across the three outfits.
CVVs: Most carding shops show the following information about
each CVV to their visitors: BIN (Bank Identification Number),
card brand (Visa, Discover, Amex, etc.), card type (credit versus
debit), card mark (Platinum, Classic, Prepaid, etc.), expiration date,
country, state, city, zip, base name1, price. Naturally, not all this in-
formation is needed to complete an online transaction. The reason
for providing base names as well as brands and marks of cards is to
allow customers to make an informed purchase. For example, it is
easier for someone to ‘cash out’ a CVV if they live in the same city
as the original owner of the card since an online order would raise
less suspicion if there is only a minor difference (i.e. street name)
in billing and shipping addresses.
Dumps: The vast majority of carding shops show the following
information about each credit and debit card dump to their visitors:
BIN, card brand, card type, card mark, expiration date, Tracks 1
or 2 present2, country, issuing bank. Similar to CVVs, information
1Card base name is a name/label/code word assigned to a particular
batch of stolen credit or debit cards by the miscreants.
2Tracks 1 and 2 are magnetic tracks on credit and debit cards that
contain information used for financial transactions
such as issuing bank and country of origin is not required to make
a purchase in brick-and-mortar stores, and the only reason that it is
provided is to give potential customers the availability to pick and
choose cards that will bring them the most revenue.
As for differences in information shown across carding shops,
although dumps.pw shows the last four credit/debit card digits to
their customers before the purchase, neither rescator.cm nor
2pac.cc provided that information. In addition, all three web-
sites seem to be assigning unrelated base names to the cards that
they are selling. For example, “SILVER_WORLD2” and “SIL-
VER_JULY14_HUGE” for 2pac.cc, “2 october arkansas” and
“14 october new york” for dumps.pw, “American Sanctions 13”
and “European Sanctions 2” for rescator.cm. Such differences
make it difficult, and in some cases impossible, for one to analyze
the data and make valid comparisons since there is no way to re-
cover the omitted debit card brand on rescator.cm or infer the
last four digits of a credit card sold by 2pac.cc without making
a purchase. In order to account for these issues without discard-
ing any data, we manually labeled all impossible to resolve cases
as ‘other’, which is also how we labeled all infrequently occurring
card brands, issuing banks, and countries of origin.
3.3 Data sanitization
We use the term snapshot to refer to an iteration of our scraper
subsequently in this paper. Under ideal conditions, it would give
us an exact copy of all data available at a carding shop at that point
of time. Overall, we collected 4,063 snapshots for rescator.cm
and dumps.pw. We were also able to collect three snapshots from
2pac.cc. Out of these, two-thirds of the snapshots were usable.
The rest were discarded due to the incompleteness resulting from
the following problems: 1) Hosting problems for rescator.cm
and dumps.pw, which required us to manually restart the scraper;
2) Updates at carding shops, which resulted in incomplete snap-
shots; and 3) Internet connection problems on our side.
We also saw a number of inconsistencies in the collected data,
even when the data is from the same carding shop. For example,
the bank field could say “JPMORGAN CHASE BANK”, “CHASE
BANK USA”, “JP MORGAN CHASE BANK”, or “CHASE
BANK”, all of which are obviously the same. Information could
be omitted. For example, any combination of city, state, zip, coun-
try could be missing. We also saw a number of incorrect entries.
For example, text in the country field could read “United Kingdom,
CA, Los Angeles, 90065”, which cannot possibly be correct since
Los Angeles, CA 90065 is located in the U.S. and not in the United
Kingdom. Another example is an entry for a credit card where “68”
is the last four digits and 13/17 is an expiration date, both of which
are obviously incorrect because 68 is two digits and there are only
12 months in a year. All the above suggest that the card informa-
tion entry has a manual component. In addition, the inconsistencies
were themselves inconsistent which implies that there are multiple
people inputting the data.
Due to the low quality of the data, much time and effort was
spent on data sanitization. About 15% of the data we collected had
to be cleaned up, which, amongst other things, involved standard-
izing the names of the countries, banks, etc. (e.g. both “Amex” and
“AMERICAN EXPRESS” became “American Express”), inferring
missing information (i.e. determining the country if only the city
and postal/zip code are known), and ignoring invalid entries.
4 DATA ANALYSIS
After cleaning up the data collected from 2pac.cc in July-
August 2014 and rescator.cm and dumps.pw in October
2014-February 2015, we totaled 133,592 unique credit and debit
cards, all of which are used in this section. We also have a July-
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August 2014 rescator.cm data set containing 19,844 unique
cards, which we only use for temporal comparison (Section 4.7).
4.1 Volume of cards and estimated revenue
Between October 2014 and February 2015, rescator.cm sold
56,976 credit and debit cards (7,784 of which are dumps and 49,192
are CVVs) while dumps.pw sold 55,784 card dumps during a
slightly shorter time frame. According to our estimates, the av-
erage price of a dump sold on rescator.cm is $16.25 while the
average price of a CVV is $8.47. In addition, we calculated the
average price of a credit/debit card dump sold on dumps.pw to
be $11.66. Using this knowledge we estimate the gross revenues
of rescator.cm and dumps.pw to be $6,034.90 and $9,226.10
per day, respectively. This translates to $181,047 and $276,783 per
month for rescator.cm and dumps.pw, which seems to jus-
tify the risk cyber criminals are willing to take by engaging in this
illegal activity. Also, although it would have been nice to know the
revenue of 2pac.cc, we were unable to make an estimate since
their website is currently offline, and we only have one day of us-
able data to work with.
To compute revenues, we used the observation that
rescator.cm and 2pac.cc assign a unique ID to each
card in their shops, but dumps.pw does no such thing. We used
all available data fields as an artificial ID for all cards sold by
dumps.pw, which resulted in undercounting since there was more
than one card with the same last four digits, country, issuing bank,
and expiration date. As a result, the actual revenue of dumps.pw
is probably much higher than our conservative estimate.
4.2 Credit vs. debit cards
According to our data (Table 2), the average price of a card
sold on rescator.cm, 2pac.cc, and dumps.pw is $10.92,
with credit cards generally being more expensive than debit cards
($12.17 vs. $9.52). This finding is a little surprising, especially
considering that: 1) Most credit cards have somewhat low credit
limits; 2) a person’s bank account could, in theory, contain a per-
son’s life’s savings, all of which could almost instantaneously be
withdrawn using that person’s debit card information; and 3) most

















Credit 66,069 $12.17 $9.66 $15.33 $30.02
Debit 53,722 $9.52 $10.00 $9.16 $16.50
Unknown 13,782 $10.36 $9.20 $10.67 $15.45
Other 19 $11.58 $12.00 $10.00 n/a
Table 2: Card prices by type
It reportedly costs banks approximately $10.00 to reissue a credit
card [23]. In addition, a 2014 report [24] by the American Bankers
Association says that, on average, banks lose $331 per stolen debit
card and $530 per stolen credit card. If we combine this knowl-
edge with the fact that 69.95% of credit and debit cards sold by
rescator.cm, 2pac.cc, and dumps.pw are priced at or be-
low $10.00, the banks might actually be better off just purchasing
some of their cards from the carding shops, assuming, of course,
that the shops can be trusted to completely remove the card infor-
mation from their databases once a card has been sold.
Another surprising finding was that there are almost twice as
many credit cards as there are debit cards in the rescator.cm
shop while the opposite is true for 2pac.cc and dumps.pw. In
addition, approximately 10% of the cards sold by all three shops
were not identified as either credit or debit. The average price of
such a card is $10.36, which makes unidentified cards more expen-
sive than debit cards but cheaper than credit cards. Obviously, an
unidentified card could turn out to be either a credit or a debit card;
hence, it makes sense for such cards to be priced the way they are
since, at the very least, the buyer would be purchasing a debit card
(which costs less), but could possibly get a credit card (which is
more expensive).
4.3 Card brands
Here, we look at how the brand of a card affects its price. As can
be seen from Table 3, MasterCard (MC) credit and debit cards are
more expensive than the rest, with the average price being $13.64
per card. Discover cards take a distant second place, closely fol-
lowed by Visa and Maestro. On the other side of the spectrum we
have American Express (Amex) cards, which tend to have the low-
est price of all major credit/debit card brands. The premium price of
MasterCard-branded credit and debit cards could be due to the fact
that MasterCard is the most widely accepted card in the world and
boasts more automatic teller machines than any other network [25].
We also observe that carding shops tend to have more than three
times the number of Visa cards in their possession than any other
brand. One of the explanations for this phenomenon is that more
people have Visa credit and debit cards than those of any other
brand [26]. In addition, Visa is not known for its outstanding cus-
tomer service [25], which could indicate it might be more difficult
and time consuming for the customer to notify the fraud depart-
ment about a stolen credit card, all of which plays into the hands
of the miscreants. Finally, we observe that rescator.cm and
2pac.cc usually offer at least twice as many MasterCard-branded
cards as American Express cards while the number of cards of both

















Visa 79,804 $10.30 $9.41 $10.99 n/a
MC 25,978 $13.64 $11.32 $15.79 $24.89
Amex 18,503 $10.16 $8.17 $11.52 $15.89
Unknown 6,730 $9.95 $11.59 $9.76 $14.51
Discover 2,169 $10.41 $10.02 $12.39 $18.68
Maestro 372 $10.35 $10.58 $6.84 $14.53
Other 36 $9.92 $10.91 $9.26 $12.00
Table 3: Card prices by brand
4.4 Card mark
A card type (also called mark and level in underground market-
places), such as Classic, Standard, Platinum, and Signature, deter-
mines maximum credit limit, annual percentage rate (APR), and
annual fee, as well as various perks and benefits the cardholder is
entitled to receive. In addition, although it is relatively simple to
acquire a no-thrills, basic Visa card with a high APR, low credit
limit, and no perks, most banks will require the applicant to have a
high credit score along with a hefty yearly income in order to qual-
ify for one of their premium cards with high a credit limit, generous

















Classic 31,344 $7.73 $7.95 $7.61 n/a
Unknown 26,912 $9.69 $8.68 $10.06 $14.80
Platinum 26,376 $12.64 $11.03 $13.93 $22.00
Signature 10,763 $11.54 $8.21 $22.55 n/a
Standard 7,094 $9.80 $10.25 $8.72 $14.31
Premier 6,057 $12.88 $12.36 $13.57 n/a
Business 5,871 $18.14 $12.90 $21.84 $34.32
Prepaid 4,453 $7.59 $8.42 $7.43 $14.44
WorldCard 3,312 $14.34 $9.86 $24.38 $39.00
Gold 3,092 $14.42 $12.84 $16.41 $21.25
Other 8,318 $14.19 $10.21 $16.70 $32.20
Table 4: Card prices by mark
When looking at the marks of credit and debit cards, we see that
Classic, Prepaid, and Standard cards are the cheapest of the group,
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with Prepaid cards being the least expensive with an average price
of $7.59 per card (Table 4). On the other side of the spectrum we
see Business, Gold, and World Card, all of which are the first, sec-
ond, and third most expensive cards, respectively. The cheapest
cards in the list are very common in the U.S. and can be acquired
by virtually anybody with a decent credit history. More expensive
cards, on the other hand, are not as common, more difficult to at-
tain, and are usually owned by people with higher average incomes,
all of which results in higher credit limits and more opportunity for
a large purchase going unnoticed by the bank’s fraud department.
Naturally, this warrants a premium price tag. Interestingly enough,
dumps.pw usually has more Standard than Signature cards for
sale while the situation is reversed for rescator.cm, which al-
most always has three times as many Signature cards in stock.
4.5 Country of origin
We find that 82% of all credit and debit cards sold by
rescator.cm, dumps.pw, and 2pac.cc have been issued in
the U.S. (Table 5), which is hardly surprising considering that not
only have almost all recent data breaches happened in the U.S.,
but, unlike its European counterparts, the U.S. has yet to transition
to the smart chip EMV technology, which offers significantly better
anti-cloning protection than the magnetic strip-based cards. What
is surprising, however, is that a typical U.S. credit/debit card costs
less (as much as 200% less in some cases) than some cards issued in
countries such as Canada, Australia, Germany, and Thailand. One
possible explanation for this could be that banks in the U.S. feature
better fraud-detection mechanisms, which means that there is less
chance that an unauthorized transaction will go through. Interest-
ingly enough, the most expensive cards are from Nepal ($80.00 per
card), Paraguay ($70.00 per card), and Nicaragua ($54.72 per card),
while the least expensive cards come from India ($6.22 per card)
and Israel ($6.83 per card). One reason for such low prices could
be that credit cards issued in India and Israel have lower credit lim-

















U.S. 109,760 $10.25 $8.97 $11.17 $20.90
Unknown 6,734 $10.07 $13.58 $9.87 $14.51
UK 4,226 $9.11 $13.32 $8.70 $32.50
Canada 2,888 $12.39 $16.54 $10.72 $64.82
Australia 880 $23.76 $12.80 $46.15 n/a
Other 9,104 $18.69 $14.92 $26.10 $30.00
Table 5: Card prices by country of origin
4.6 Issuing bank
When looking at issuing banks, we find that most cards sold
by the carding shops have been issued by JPMorgan Chase, with
American Express and Bank of America (BofA) taking the third
and fourth places, respectively. For unknown reasons, cards issued
by FIA Card Services are sold for almost $13.50 each and are gen-
erally more expensive than the cards issued by other banks. We also
see that rescator.cm and 2pac.cc usually offer more Amer-
ican Express cards than the cards issued by both Wells Fargo and
Bank of America combined. The opposite is true for dumps.pw,
which tends to have more cards issued by Bank of America than
almost any other bank. More details can be seen in Table 6.
4.7 Volume and price of cards over time
The average price of cards sold by rescator.cm over the past
three months was between $9.06 and $17.00 while the cards offered
by dumps.pw had less variation in their prices ($10.91-$12.89).
When looking at the volume of rescator.cm and dumps.pw
over time, we see that both shops feature periods of relative inactiv-

















Chase 18,105 $11.23 $8.71 $13.78 $47.05
Unknown 17,014 $11.21 $9.41 $11.90 $15.19
Amex 11,676 $8.75 $7.96 $9.25 $15.48
BofA 10,673 $10.29 $10.79 $10.07 $19.17
Wells Fargo 7,962 $9.59 $9.16 $9.94 $35.00
Citibank 5,919 $12.27 $9.40 $16.66 $34.64
Capital One 5,033 $12.19 $9.31 $18.81 $43.40
FIA 4,964 $13.37 $7.97 $21.23 $32.84
U.S. Bank 4,602 $9.55 $8.01 $10.93 $15.05
Barclays 1,772 $13.10 $11.23 $13.57 $63.05
Other 45,872 $11.09 $11.37 $10.70 $19.68
Table 6: Card prices by issuing bank
sale. As can be seen from Figure 1a, which shows the number of
unique cards available for sale for both carding shops over a period
of the past three months, dumps.pw and rescator.cm seem
to be using different strategies for adding new cards to their shops.
The owners of dumps.pw usually add less than 3,000 new cards
per each update, with every fifth/sixth update containing 6,000+
cards. rescator.cm, on the other hand, never makes that many
cards available at the same time. Instead, it adds a moderate amount
of new cards (1,000-6,000) with each update.
Among the prominent breaches occurring during our data collec-
tion included Bebe Stores Inc. and Park-n-Fly, which explains the
seemingly never ending supply of cards offered by rescator.cm
and dumps.pw. As can be seen from Table 7, which shows the
summary of the most recent breaches, the data breaches are fol-
lowed by a major update on carding shops’ websites (Figure 1a).
In cases when the exact time frame of the data breach is unknown,
which is true for Park-n-Fly, OneStopParking.com, and Chick-fil-
A, the date when the breach was first reported seems to be preceded
by a major update on rescator.cm and dumps.pw.
Company Date of the breach
St. Louis Parking Company occurred on 10/06/2014 - 10/31/2014 [27]
SP+ occurred on 04/14/2014 - 11/10/2014 [28]
Bebe Stores Inc. occurred on 11/08/2014 - 11/26/2014 [29]
Park-n-Fly 1st reported on December 16, 2014 [30]
OneStopParking.com 1st reported around December 18, 2014 [31]
Chick-fil-A 1st reported in November 2014 [32]
Book2Park.com occurred on 10/01/2014 - 01/24/2015 [33]
Table 7: Timeline of recent data breaches
When comparing prices on rescator.cm between July-
August 2014 and the present, we see that a typical credit/debit card
CVV is 33 cents more expensive now than in 2014, while a dump
is $3.84 more expensive. One possible explanation for this could
be that there have been a large number of high and not-so-high pro-
file data breaches since August 2014, which resulted in more high
quality cards available for sale.
When looking at the issuing bank, we see that rescator.cm
used to offer a significantly higher percentage of Chase cards for
sale in July-August 2014 compared to their current inventory. Fur-
thermore, while all other banks’ credit and debit cards sell for more
now than they used to, cards issued by Bank of America were actu-
ally more expensive on rescator.cm in 2014 with the average
price being almost $1.00 higher compared to 2015 (Figure 1b).
Finally, we observe that American Express is the only ma-
jor brand that costs less now than it used to last year. In addi-
tion, we see that Maestro cards have almost doubled in price on
rescator.cm over time. One possible explanation for this could
be that there were too few American Express cards for sale last
year (13.28% of all cards now vs. 1.61% of all cards in July-August
2014), which increased the demand for them, thus, raising the price.












































































































































































(a) Unique cards added to rescator.cm and




















































(c) Card types (rescator.cm in 2014 vs.
rescator.cm now)
Figure 1: Changes in price and volume of cards on rescator.cm and dumps.pw over time
5 RELATED WORKS
Although there have been a number of studies on underground
marketplaces and detecting and preventing various kinds of fraud,
very few of them have analyzed the underground marketplaces in-
volved in selling stolen credit and debit cards. Multiple papers [34–
36] propose to use machine learning, data mining, and other meth-
ods to detect credit card fraud, but they do not really analyze what
actually happens to the credit card once it has been stolen. Oth-
ers [37, 38] are measurement studies which evaluate and review
the existing approaches of detecting credit card fraud.
A 2007 measurement study by Franklin et al. [7] focused on un-
derground marketplaces for credit card fraud, identity theft, spam-
ming, phishing, online credential theft, and the sale of compro-
mised hosts. The depth of focus on credit cards was limited due to
the broad nature of the study. Moreover, the paper only used pub-
licly posted IRC messages, which hid transactions that occurred via
private messages. Underground black markets have evolved much
since that study, with IRC losing popularity among fraudsters. Fur-
ther, our paper focuses only on credit and debit cards.
A more recent study by Thomas et al. [8] is closer in spirit to our
paper. We complement their preliminary work by studying debit
cards in addition to credit cards, as well as card dumps and CVVs.
Further, we estimate the revenue of underground carding shops,
which was not characterized. Finally, our two data collection time
periods allow us to draw inferences regarding the debit and credit
card prices as well as volume of sales over time.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we collect and analyze data from three web-based
underground carding shops. We encountered various impediments
during and after data collection. The shops regularly went offline
for maintenance, updates, and other reasons. They also changed
domain names to evade law enforcement. Their hosting was of-
ten spotty, with web pages not loading on occasion. Virtually all
of them evolved during our data collection to make scraping data
difficult: they not only required CAPTCHA solutions before grant-
ing access to data but some even required solving CAPTCHAs in
the middle of a session. Further, CloudFlare’s DDoS protection
blocked our scraper from accessing data until we found a way to
imitate a real web browser.
In spite of these hurdles, we collected data for two different time
periods for a combination of three websites. The analysis offered
interesting insights into the financial motivations of miscreants be-
hind these outfits. The lower sale price on about 70% of stolen
cards compared to the cost of re-issuing a card suggested that banks
might indeed find it cheaper to “buy back” their own cards instead
of re-issuing. We found carding websites to be efficient, in that
stolen cards are available for purchase soon after a breach. Finally,
as the EMV technology takes off in the U.S. to protect against card
cloning, our study can serve as a benchmark to estimate its impact
on card fraud in the U.S.
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